BENEFIT 25: The difference between "issues of Khilāf" and "issues of Ijtihād"

The difference between the two is as follows: THE 1ST DIFFERENCE: "issues of Khilāf" are broader than "issues of Ijtihād", because not every differing is valid/recognised, thus the differing may be an issue of Khilāf, but not an issue of Ijtihād. For example: There are two views in an issue; one side substantiates their view using an authentic ḥadīth while the other side uses logical reasoning (ra'yi) or analogy (qiyās) because the ḥadīth has not reached them. So this is considered an "issue of khilāf" because differing has occurred, but it is not an "issue of Ijtihād" (because the differing is not valid)! The "issue of Ijtihād" is that which wherein the evidences are very similar; each side has sound and strong evidences, even if you were to analyse between the two and conclude that one view is stronger than the other, this does not annul/invalidate the other view. Practical examples include, touching the muṣ-ḥaf without being in a state of ritual impurity, what necessitates the first taḥallul (exiting the state of Iḥrām during Ḥajj)?...these are issues of Ijtihād because the evidences are strong on both sides. THE 2ND DIFFERENCE: The principle: لا إنكار في مسائل الاجتهاد (There's no criticism is issues of Ijtihād) applies with relation to "issues of Ijtihād", not "issues of Khilāf"...but it's fine to hold knowledge-based discussions/debates in issues of Ijtihād in order to reach an accurate conclusion in the matter, without criticising one another as though a contravention has been committed. So it's not correct to say: لا إنكار في مسائل الخلاف! Because it is possible to rebuke/criticise the opposing side in issues of Khilāf; especially if one side has weak evidences and the other side has strong evidences. It may be that the one who professed this view originally has an excuse, but the one who comes after him and is aware of the evidences is not excused. For example, Abū Ḥanīfah raḥimahullāh expresses an incorrect view based on analogy because the evidence had not reached him, he is excused and is reward for his Ijtihād, but the Ḥanafi in our time who is aware of the evidence opposing this has no excuse. Rather he is rebuked and criticised. Furthermore, the principle: لا إنكار في مسائل الاجتهاد does not prevent us from comparing the different views in order to determine which is more correct.