BENEFIT: Jarḥ wa Taʿdīl Is Generally Not Subject to Ijtihād

The science of Al-Jarḥ wa At-Taʿdīl, in its foundational aspect, is a matter of consensus and is binding upon us. We are required to adhere to it as an established principle. However, when it comes to certain subsidiary or detailed applications within the field, the rulings may vary and can fall under the broader classifications found in other areas of Sharīʿah, such as: 1. Issues over which there is إجماع, 2. Issues wherein there is خلاف, and 3. Issues that are subject to اجتهاد. This categorisation of some subsidiary aspects of Jarḥ wa Taʿdīl does not negate the fact that its foundational basis is not a matter of ijtihād, and that it remains binding in its general framework. And Allāh knows best. ------------- Related benefit ⤵️ https://t.me/almanhajussalafi/90 ------------- Question: Some require further elaboration on this benefit ⤵️ https://t.me/almanhajussalafi/89 Sheikh Salmān Al-Imād hafidahullāh responds: Yes, may Allāh preserve you. I believe we have previously addressed this matter and stated that issues related to jarḥ (criticism) and taʿdīl (praise) are not to be considered absolutely definitive (qaṭʿiyyah) nor absolutely discretionary (ijtihādiyyah). Each of these positions, if taken in an absolute sense, entails corrupt consequences. If we were to claim that these issues are definitively established in all cases, that would entail problematic implications, including Undermining the credibility of the Salaf and those who disagreed in matters of jarḥ, taʿdīl, authentication, weakening, and related issues. On the other hand, if we were to claim that these issues are purely ijtihādi in all cases, that too would lead to harmful consequences—such as opening the door to undermining the credibility of trustworthy narrators, rejecting the reports of upright individuals, and dismissing Jarh mufassar, among other issues. Therefore, there is no overarching and absolute rule that can comprehensively govern all cases. Rather, it depends on the critic (Al-jāriḥ) and the one being criticised (Al-majrūḥ). If one insists on formulating a general principle, then it may be said: Criticism is to be evaluated based on the credibility of both the critic and the one criticised. This evaluation depends on the critic’s integrity, trustworthiness, precision, piety, and knowledge of the principles of Jarḥ and Taʿdīl, and similarly, on the state of the one being criticised—whether his condition is clear or ambiguous, and whether the criticism against him is based on certain knowledge, probabilities, or other factors. Hence, the issue is judged according to the respective conditions of the critic and the one criticised, all while observing the established principles of Jarḥ and Taʿdīl. This field has already been thoroughly served; we do not need to reconstruct its foundations. The scholars of Jarḥ and Taʿdīl have made significant contributions and laid down clear and detailed principles for these matters. Thus, there is no need to resort to newly invented methodologies. The methodologies of the early generations and their approach to these issues are clear and well-known. Many who have entered this discourse have various motives—some display excessiveness, others negligence. There are those who approach the matter with extreme rigidity, insisting that their view must be followed, claiming, “The one who knows is a proof over the one who does not,” and asserting, “I know that so-and-so is ḥizbī and therefore should not be taken from”—thus compelling others to follow their judgment, even if more senior scholars have disagreed with them. They invoke principles like “explained criticism” and similar arguments. On the other side, some take an overly lax approach, reducing Jarḥ and Taʿdīl to mere matters of ijtihād. For example, if I were to say “So-and-so is ḥizbī, or Ikhwani, or should not be taken from”—they respond that it is a matter of ijtihād, so they deem it permissible to take from such individuals.